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This thesis investigates the reenlistment behavior of Ih S. Naval
personnel who have completed more than two enlistment terms in the Navy.
The Navy's 110 ratings are grouped into 24 occupational fields which
represent clusters of similar skills, similar working conditions, and
similar duty assignments. Multiple regression techniques are used to
examine the relationship of economic variables to career reenlistment
behavior.
The main conclusions of the study are:
a. Economic variables such as military compensation, unemploy-
ment, and civilian wage opportunities are statistically significant
predictors of career petty officer retention behavior.
b. All -navy reenlistment rate can wery accurately be predicted
using a regression model with economic variables when the independent
variables are within the range of values used to generate the regression
model
.
c. Such regression models generally have very low predictive
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Most of the published research concerning the retention of military
personnel has focused on the initial term of active obligated service.
This thesis addresses a different but yery important segment of military
manpower, the careerist. Specifically, it investigates the retention
behavior of career petty officers in the U. S. Navy.
For most non-rated navy members and junior petty officers, much of
the first term is spent in formal schools and intensive on-the-job
training. Using a human capital approach, these servicemembers are
receiving a "loan" from the navy which has the expectation that their
post-school productivity will "pay back" the "loan." Since World War
II, and especially since the early 1960's, the amount of training
required to operate and maintain the sophisticated equipment has in-
creased the length and cost of the loan period. It may be questioned
whether the enlistee can be productive enough in a four year period
to pay back the navy. The navy is therefore faced with two options:
to increase the length of the initial enlistment, or to increase the
reenlistment rate for first, second, third, and subsequent
reenlistments.
The extension of the initial enlistment to six years has been
done for some ratings that require over 12 months of initial formal
schooling. The second option, however, is the one that is the most
promising since it seeks to encourage personnel to remain voluntarily
on active duty. By increasing the inducements for reenlistments, the

Navy will have a wider selection for the more senior grades and can
select only the best qualified persons to manage and lead the enlisted
force. The retention rate for personnel who have reenlisted at least
once decreased rather steadily during the period 1976 to 1980. Although
the downward trend suddenly stopped in the 4th quarter of FY 1980, and
is now on the rise, it should not be assumed that a problem of retaining
experienced petty officers will not return.
This thesis is an investigation into the reenlistment behavior of
those personnel who have reenlisted at least once before. The Navy's
110 ratings are grouped into 24 occupational fields which represent
clusters of similar skills, similar working conditions, and similar
duty assignments. Several models which have been published by other
researchers are analyzed using occupational field data. It is the
goal of this thesis to develop forecast models to predict occupational
specific retention rates. New models are developed using career re-
enlistment data and economic variables from the period FY 1976 to
FY 1980. All models are subjected to tests of validity and forecasting
value.
If significant differences exist among occupational fields in re-
enlistment rates or predictors of those rates, it may be to the Navy's
advantage to investigate further occupational field or rating specific
manpower policies and offer selective inducements for career reenlist-
ments as is currently done with the first term reenlistment bonus
„
The career reenlistment bonus program, which is still new compared to
the first term bonus program, may need to be modified to be more
sensitive to the actual determinants of career reenlistments.

Chapter II presents a review of previous reenlistment studies. The
first section presents models that emphasize service policy variables.
The second section presents models that emphasize civilian economic
variables.
Chapter III presents the methodology used in developing the
variables for use in linear regression analysis. There are basically
four categories of variables used in this thesis: military compensation;
male 25-39 year old unemployment rates; measures of civilian economic
conditions including earnings; and military/civilian wage ratios.
Chapter IV presents and discusses the results of single and multiple
linear regression equations.
Chapter V presents the conclusions of the study and the implications
for navy manpower policy and future research.
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II. REVIEW OF SELECTED PUBLISHED STUDIES ON
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPLY
This chapter presents a review of previous reenlistment studies.
The first section presents models that emphasize service policy vari-
ables. The second section presents models that emphasize civilian
economic variables.
A RETENTION DETERMINED BY SERVICE POLICY VARIABLES
1 . Training Cost and the Draft
Drexler, in 1975 [Ref. 1], conducted a study which related
costs of training and reasons for enlistment under the draft to the
first term reenlistment decision. He hypothesized that true volunteers
had a different reenlistment behavior than draft motivated personnel.
The cost of training factor was added to be able to predict the re-
enlistment of those personnel trained in more costly skills. Drexler
used three classifications for reason of enlistment: draft motivated
persons, choice motivated persons, and true volunteers. Draft motiva-
ted persons were those who anticipated being conscripted, and therefore
enlisted in the Navy as an escape from the Army. Choice motivated
persons also enlisted to avoid the draft, but specifically chose the
Navy over other services. True volunteers did not face conscription,
but enlisted in the Navy anyway. Training costs for ratings were
taken from Bureau of Naval Personnel records. Data for the study were
collected by a survey of 2522 first term personnel. The sample was




The results of the survey show that the largest proportion of those
who showed an intention to reenlist came from the true volunteer classi-
fication (29 percent). This was followed by choice motivated persons
(19 percent) and draft avoiders (7 percent). When training costs were
considered, 40 percent of the true volunteers who received expensive
training (N=75) intended to reenlist. In general, the largest proportion
of persons intending to reenlist were in the expensive training category
(25% out of N=209).
Drexler also tried to determine the best predictors of first term
reenlistment intention in each combination of training cost and method
of entry classification. Individual navy experience factors were used
as independent variables separated into three categories: facets of
organizational climate, facets of supervisor interaction, and the
relationship with peers. The results of linear regression analysis
showed that little variance in the reenlistment intention of draft
avoiders could be explained by the in-service experience variables.
For true volunteers, on the other hand, in-service experience variables
accounted for 60 percent of the variance in their reenlistment
intentions .
Drexler concluded that the threat of the draft did make a difference
in the attitude of enlistees and that this effect showed up at the first
reenlistment point.
2. Training Costs and the Reenlistment Bonus
The relationship between training costs and first term reenlist-
ment was also analyzed in a study by Stewart in 1976 [Ref. 2]. Stewart
hypothesized that the type of occupational skill acquired, which could
12

be costed, played a significant role in the decision to reenlist at the
end of the initial period of service. His data were from all -navy first
term reenlistment statistics in 1972. He reasoned that those who had
undergone more costly training have probably acquired a higher skill
and are more likely to be motivated to a career in the military than
those who receive less technical, less costly skill training. Measuring
training cost by the number of Naval Enlisted Classification (NEC)
codes a person had, and the length of training undergone, Stewart found
that enlistees with two or more NEC's had a reenlistment rate of 31%
while those with one or no NEC's had a reenlistment rate of 21%.
Comparing the length of training for 31 ratings, Stewart found that
those who underwent lengthly (costly) training were more likely to
reenlist than those whose training was brief and cheap.
In addition to training costs, Stewart examined the effect of the
first term reenlistment bonus on first term and career reenlistments.
The variable reenlistment bonus (VRB) had a positive but not statisti-
cally significant effect on first term reenlistment when used in a
linear regression model. He did find a statistically significant
negative relation between second term reenlistment and the presence
of a first term bonus. Stewart concluded that the lack of a second
reenlistment bonus is significant and such a bonus would increase the
retention of career petty officers.
A study specifically focusing on the effect on reenlistment rates
of a reenlistment bonus was conducted by Kleinman and Shugart in 1974
[Ref. 3]. Data were gathered on first and second reenlistments for 37
navy ratings for the period 1966 to 1973. Linear and logit regression
13

models were used to estimate the effect on the first term reenlistment
rate of the first term reenlistment bonus. To study the effect of VRB
on later reenlistments, continuation rates from the sixth to eleventh
year were used as a proxy for the second term reenlistment rate.
Two base periods were chosen for analysis, FY 1966 to FY 1971, and
FY 1967 to FY 1972. The periods were chosen because all ratings in
these periods had no reenlistment bonus at one time during the periods.
The two base periods also contained persons who reenlisted without VRB
in FY 1964 and FY 1965. These non-receivers' continuation rates were
compared with reenlistees in the same ratings who received a first term
bonus in FY 1966. Two main hypotheses were tested. First, that the
first term reenlistment rate is significantly and positively correlated
with the VRB. Second, that individuals induced to reenlist by a first
term bonus are less likely to reenlist again than those who did not
receive a first term bonus.
Between the period FY 1968-1973 and the base period FY 1966-1971,
the continuation rate for those personnel who never received a VRB fell
by 1-1/2 percentage points. The continuation rate for personnel who
received VRB fell by only 1 percentage point. The continuation rate
for those personnel who received VRB for an earlier reenlistment fell
by 2 percentage points. Regression results of both the linear and
logit models also showed a lack of a strong inverse relationship
between VRB and continuation rates. Kleinman and Shugart concluded
that individuals who are induced to reenlist by a VRB are as likely to




3 Military Pay and the Reenlistment Bonus
A study to examine the responsiveness of Navy reenlistments
to the large military pay increase of November 1971 was conducted by
Haber and Stewart in 1975 [Ref. 4], Reenlistment rates for paygrades
E-4 to E-9 in CY 1971 and CY 1972 were compared among four occupational
groups: Craftsmen, Clerical, Service, and Miscellaneous. The study
assumed the wages of civilians in comparable jobs did not change as
drastically as military wages did and, in fact, remained static. VRB
was taken into account by further segregating those ratings within each
of the four occupational groups which received a first term reenlistment
bonus.
First term reenlistment rates were found to be higher for the
VRB receivers than for non-VRB receivers for all groups. The average
reenlistment rates for 1971 were 20.4% for VRB ratings, 10.6% for non-
VRB ratings. For 1972 the figures were 27.3% and 14.7%, respectively.
The elasticity of first term reenlistments with respect to
military pay was calculated by dividing the percentage change in the
reenlistment rate for each occupational group and paygrade by the
percentage change in pay for the paygrade. The results showed that
for non-VRB ratings the elasticity exceeded 3.00 in 7 of 12 cases. The
average elasticity for non-VRB ratings across all groups was 2.38. For
VRB receivers an elasticity of 3.00 occurred in 5 of 11 cases. In
general, the pay elasticity tended to be smaller in the VRB ratings
than in the non-VRB ratings.
Careerists were defined in the study as individuals who had
reenlisted one or more times. Since VRB was offered only at the first
15

reenlistment, no distinction was made between VRB and non-VRB ratings.
Again, comparing the four occupational groups during the periods CY 1971
72, the study showed that reenlistment rates increased uniformily with
paygrade. Paygrade E-4 reenlistment rates averaged 55.9% and 61.0% for
the periods while those of E-7/8/9's averaged 99.0% and 99.2%. In both
years the E-4 Craftsmen showed the lowest reenlistment rates with 52.6%
in 1971 and 57.5% in 1972. Haber and Stewart concluded that since
careerists had a much higher reenlistment rate than first termers,
factors other than pay probably played an important role in their re-
enlistment decision. One such factor which they felt was the most
important was the potential of receiving a pension after 20 years of
service at age 39-41. No attempt was made to quantify the real or per-
ceived present value of this pension in the study. Supporting their
conclusion about the role of pensions was that careerist reenlistment
rates were apparently only slightly affected by the November 1971 pay
raise. The 1972 rates aggregated for all groups showed only a slight
increase, from 89.4% to 90.8%. Predictably, the largest increase,
from 55.9% to 61.0% occurred in the E-4's as their pay increased by a
larger percent than did the senior groups.
A markedly different approach to analyzing the effect of
military pay on reenlistments was undertaken by Masse! 1 in 1976
[Ref. 5], Linear regression using military compensation as the sole
independent variable gave the mean and standard deviation of the
reservation wage* Military pay was defined as base pay, BAQ (with and
without dependents sets were formed), subsistence allowance, federal
tax advantage on non-taxable allowances, proficiency pay and VRB. The
16

sample was composed of white, male high school graduates less than
19-1/2 years old and who were in Air Force electronics specialties and
who made their first reenlistment decisions in FY 1972.
The reservation wage is a hypothetical wage perceived by the
person which can affect his reenlistment decision. If the reservation
wage is greater than his military pay over the next enlistment period,
he would not reenlist. If the reservation wage is less than his
military pay over the next enlistment, he will reenlist. If it is
equal, he is indifferent to reenli sting or leaving the military. In the
last case the average reenlistment rate would be 50%. The concept of
reservation wage is not unique to Massell's study. A more complete ex-
planation can be found in Cooper [Ref. 6].
The mean and standard deviation of the reservation wage was
mathematically derived by reasoning that the probability of separation
is the same as the separation rate given a large sample size. The
reenlistment rate is (1-separation rate). The separation rate is also
equal to the probability that the reservation wage is greater than the
perceived military wage.
Specifically:
Prob (R W) = Prob ^^- = Z>Y = w
"^
where formally;
R = Reservation wage
J*- - Mean of R
°"
= Standard deviation of R
Z = Standardized normal variable
W = Military compensation
17

Y = A value derived from the normal distribution table
such that the probability that Z is greater than Y
is equal to the separation rate (1 - reenlistment rate)
The mean and standard deviation were estimated by the linear model
Y = ocw + C
where formally:
Y = Reenlistment rate
<* = Coefficient of military compensation variable
C = Constant derived from the linear regression equation
The parameters of the reservation wage are computed as follows:
*- i
A = -(ft
The models are intended to predict group rather than individual reenlist-
ment behavior. Additionally, the most reliable results would be detained
if the persons in the sample had similar characteristics, service ex-
periences, and preceptions of the military. Massell termed these groups
to be "homogeneous groups."
The sample was divided into six subgroups: Electronics Repairmen
with and without dependents, Electronics Specialists with and without
dependents, and the combined total with and without dependents.
The reservation wages developed from linear regression were
larger than the military compensation amounts in every subgroup.
Reservation wages were also larger than the means of civilian earnings
reported on a post-service survey of the sample members who did
separate during FY 1972. The R square varied from .38 to .89 with
a mean of .75. Men with dependents were found to behave as though
18

having the dependents resulted in an increase to military compensation
of about $15,000, regardless of the number of dependents. This was
derived from their lower reservation wage and therefore higher reenlist-
ment rate. Massell reasoned that what also may be affecting the
reenlistment rate of men with dependents is the higher value they place
on stability of employment than do single servicemen. Massell's
finding here is consistent with a study by Grace [Ref. 7] on the effect
of dependents on Navy reenlistment. Grace found by survey that 64.4%
of the Navy wives questioned were willing for their husbands to reenlist.
An even greater percent, 69.9%, would encourage their husbands to
reenlist if the decision had to be made immediately,
B. RETENTION DETERMINED BY IN-SERVICE AND CIVILIAN ECONOMIC VARIABLES
1 . Military Compensation, Civilian Opportunities and Personal
Characteristics
Enns [Ref. 8] used FY 1971 reenlistment data for 1638 Navy,
Air Force and Army servicemembers to identify predictors of the first
term reenlistment rate. The independent variables for the Navy personnel
were VRB, base pay, age at enlistment, AFQT score and education. The
Army and Air Force data included estimated civilian earnings if the
service member left the military at the end of the first term. The
civilian earnings variable was recognized by Enns as being of question-
able accuracy. It was constructed using mean hourly wage data reported
by former service members about ten months after discharge. A 40 hour
workweek and 50 work weeks per year were assumed. Civilian earnings
data for Navy personnel were not available, consequently this variable
19

was not used in the Navy linear regression equations. Linear regression
showed that for all models the VRB variable was positive and statisti-
cally significant at the .05 level. The coefficient of the earnings
variable was negative and significant for the Army, but not significant
for the Air Force. Education level was negative and significant for
all three models while AFQT was negative for the Army and Navy, but not
significant for the Air Force. Age at enlistment also showed variation
between services. Enns concluded that no one model was valid for all
three services and that individual service characteristics play an
important role in accounting for first term reenlistment rates.
Enns computed the elasticity of first term reenlistment with
respect to VRB. The elasticities for both the Air Force (3.4) and the
Navy (2.5) were greater than the military pay-first term reenlistment
elasticities reported by the Gates Commission: 2.4 and 2.1 for the Air
Force and Navy, respectively. The Army elasticity of 2.1 was lower than
the Gates Commission estimate of 2.4. Enns found that the reenlistment
elasticity was greater for the cohort receiving their VRB in a lump sum
as opposed to installment payments. He concluded, as had Kleinman
and Shugart, that VRB has a positive and significant effect on first
term reenlistment, especially if paid in a lump sum.
2. Military Compensation and National Economic Variables
Segregation of enlistees into occupational groups was under-
taken by Reedy [Ref. 9] to investigate the differences in first term
reenlistment rates among occupational groups due to economic variables.
Nine occupational groups were used to categorize all navy ratings:
Deck, Ordnance, Electronics and Precision, Administrative, Seaman,
20

Engine and Hull, Construction, Aviation, and Medical/Dental. Twenty
years of first term reenlistment rates, from 1958 to 1977, drawn from
Navy published reports were used as the dependent variable. The in-
dependent variables chosen were: the national unemployment rate,
national wage data, unemployment rates for the major census occupational
categories (white collar, clerical, sales, blue collar, and service
workers), the ratio of military compensation to private sector wages,
and unemployment and earnings rates for the standard industrial classifi-
cations (private household, construction, agriculture, service
purchasing, and more). Reedy attempted to estimate the best single
equation that would include the variables which were the most con-
sistently significant (.05 level) over all of the nine groups.
Results of linear regression showed that the independent
variables varied in significance over the nine groups. The national
unemployment rate was significant in 7 of the groups. A lagged unemploy-
ment rate was significant in only 4 of 9 groups. The ratio of military
compensation (base pay, BAQ, and tax advantage) to private sector wages
was significant for all but the Seaman and Construction groups, and was
positive in all cases. The coefficients for the compensation ratio
were smaller than those for either the national unemployment rate lagged
or not lagged. Reedy concluded that improving military compensation
would be an uneconomic method of improving retention, For example, the
Electronics and Precision group had the largest relative wage coefficient
.84, but it would take a 19.3% compensation increase to raise the re-
enlistment rate 5 percent. The R square value of the models varied
across the groups from a low of .51 for Medical /Dental to .84 for
Electronics and Precision. The mean R square was .71.
21

Reedy ' s conclusions were that military compensation cannot
reasonably be increased enough to counteract the effects of a strong
economy at enlistment or reenlistment points. Further, the granting of
reenlistment bonuses may have a greater effect on reenlistment than an
across-the-board pay increase. Finally, Reedy concluded that unemploy-
ment and earning rates for different civilian occupational groups do
not have as much an effect on the first term reenlistment rate as does
the national unemployment rate, irrespective of age. This last con-
clusion will be examined in this thesis using the retention rates of
Navy enlisted careerists.
The only study dedicated specifically to enlisted persons on
their second or subsequent reenlistment was done by Bradley in 1980
[Ref. 10]. Bradley hypothesized that careerists' reenlistment behavior
could be predicted by analyzing economic variables alone. Careerists
were defined as those persons with at least seven years of service.
Yearly data on careerists for the period FY 1956 to FY 1979 were used
in the estimating equations derived by linear regression. All ratings
were combined to obtain an aggregate reenlistment rate.
Independent variables used in the regression were Regular
Military Compensation (base pay, married BAQ, sea pay), National Unem-
ployment Rate, Mean Civilian Wages for regions with large naval popula-
tions, Military/Civilian pay ration, Civilian Wages of Navy Jobs, and a
Consumer Price Index used to proxy civilian wage opportunities. Other
economic variables were used but were rejected early in the analysis;




Bradley's results showed that three of the variables, Regular
Military Compensation, National Unemployment Rate, and the Consumer
2
Price Index of All Services Less Rent provided a R of .774 when used
together to predict the reenlistment rate of Navy enlisted careerists.
This three variable model was used to predict the reenlistment rate for
each year of the study. It came within 9.45 percentage points for
each year, the mean error being only 3.48 percentage points. Lagging
the unemployment rate did not improve the model. This contrasts some-
what with Reedy' s result that a 6 to 9 month lagged unemployment rate
is a better predictor variable, although Reedy 's study covered only
first term reenlistment.
The previous studies, with one exception, (Bradley), grouped
the enlisted populations by either rating (Kleinman and Shugart),
occupational group (Reedy, Haber and Stewart) or relative training cost
(Drexler, Stewart). A different method of grouping enlisted personnel
was conducted by Butterworth and Milch [Ref. 11] in a study to determine
the feasibility of forecasting future states of the enlisted force.
The loss behavior of all navy enlisted personnel during the period 1966
to 1972 was used. Ratings that exhibited similar loss behavior were
grouped, or clustered. The hypothesis was that clustering by loss be-
havior may reflect a homogeniety in reenlistment attitude not apparent
from the usual clustering by rating, paygrade, or occupational group.
The study tried a coarse grouping of only three clusters, and
a finer grouping of ten clusters. The estimated loss rate for FY 1973
for each cluster was obtained from a weighted average of the actual
loss rates during FY 1966-72, The same weighted average was used for
23

each rating, using no clustering. They concluded that no significant
improvement in loss estimation could be found due to grouping by loss
behavior. The study did show, however, that some ratings have loss
characteristics in common that are not deducible from normal grouping
schemes. For example, Dental Technicians and Aviation Machinist Mates
had similar loss rates throughout the period, and there were other
ratings showing very similar loss rates. The authors draw no conclusions
from this occurrence. Finding a scheme to develop homogeneous groupings
of enlisted personnel is necessary for the optimal application of
Massell's model, so the contribution of studies such as Butterworth
and Milch's should not be overlooked.
C. SHORTFALLS IN PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The number and variety of models used to predict reenlistment behavior
suggest that more research is warranted. All of the predictive models
reviewed concluded that economic variables are by far the most important
predictors of reenlistment behavior for first termers (Masse! 1, Reedy)
and careerists (Bradley). The studies on the effect of the reenlist-
ment bonus (Kleinman and Shugart, Stewart) were done during the period
of the Variable Reenlistment Bonus (VRB), The VRB has been replaced
by the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) and the Career Reenlistment
Bonus (CRB), both of which can give higher cash awards relative to
base pay than did VRB. A major limitation of the Kleinman and Shugart
study is that they used cohorts of personnel entering the Navy during
the height of the Viet Nam War. The anticipation or apprehension
concerning the rapidly increasing role of the Navy during the escalation
24

of the 1960 ' s may have influenced career decisions. In addition, the
absence of a G.I. Bill post service education benefit from 1957 to 1965
may have affected the willingness of service members to remain on
active duty.
Grouping methods are frequently necessary in order to have large
enough sample sizes when analyzing reenlistment behavior. Of the
methods reviewed, Massell's idea of homogeneous groups is conceptually
pleasing, but not reinforced in her methodology. No mention is given
of the actual number of cases in each of her six cohorts. Bradley
developed a highly predictive equation but used a rather coarse all Navy
grouping method - all Navy enlisted personnel who had greater than 7
years of service regardless of rate, sex, or age.
The Navy has separate staffs to monitor the manpower and personnel
makeup of ratings according to a grouping method used to formulate man-
power policy for individual ratings. The ratings are grouped so that
each rating staff, called Enlisted Rating Coordinators, handles about
8 or 9 ratings with each rating handled as a separate entity. It is
desirable, therefore, to estimate the effect on the Navy personnel
structure at a by-rating level.
Haber and Stewart showed a positive correlation between VRB and
first reenlistment, but the non-VRB group increased its reenlistment
rate by 38.6%, whereas the VRB receivers increased by only 33.8%.
Clearly, other factors affected their reenlistment decisions. Reedy
concluded that most first term enlisted Navy personnel do not consider
their pay to be really made up of items other than base pay. The
standard RMC was not as effective a predictor of reenlistment behavior
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as was base pay. When considering career petty officers, however, one
would expect them to be more aware of the full extent of their compensa-
tion. Career petty officers are more likely to be married, and therefore
are receiving a considerably higher quarters allowance relative to base
pay. Bradley used RMC in his careerist retention equations, but did not
compare it with the predictive value of base pay alone.
Finally, none of the studies researched for this thesis used the
grouping scheme resulting from the Naval Enlisted Occupational Classifi-
cation System (NEOCS) Study of 1974 [Ref. 12]. This thesis uses the
NEOCS grouping scheme to test previous retention models and develop new
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A. RETENTION AND REENLISTMENT
Every person who initially enlisted in the Navy may believe that
he/she will be allowed to reenlist if he/she chooses to do so at the
end of the enlistment contract. Circumstances arise, however, that
can render some persons ineligible to reenlist, A circumstance outside
of individual control is a reduction in military strength ordered by
the Secretary of Defense, or Congress. This occurred in the early
1970's as the nation's involvement in Southeast Asia wound down.
Other reasons that may cause a person to become ineligible for
reenlistment are below-standard physical fitness, drug or alcohol
dependency, regulation infractions, and age. The retention rate does
not distinguish the loss of a person ineligible to reenlist from the
loss of a person eligible to reenlist. Hence the retention rate is
not as appropriate an indication of the aggregate desire of the
service members to remain in the Navy. This is parti culary a problem
when measuring first term reenlistment roles.
It is reasonable to assume, however, that personnel who are
designated as careerists are not very likely to become ineligible for
further reenlistment due to drug or alcohol dependency, regulation
infractions or other reasons of sub-standard performance. Rather, they
leave the service mainly for one of two reasons - they reach the 20
year service point and are eligible for retirement with lifetime pension
or they reach the age limit and are ineligible for further active duty.
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Less than one-half of one percent of enlisted personnel over 25 years
of service were over 50 years old during any given calendar quarter
between 1973 and 1980. Therefore, this study makes no distinction
between careerist reenlistment rate and careerist retention rate. The
quarterly career reenlistment rates for each rating are used as the
2
measure of careerist retention. This is necessary in order to utilize
the available data contained in Navy Military Personnel Statistics
(NAVPERS 15658).
B. DEFINITIONS
Throughout this study, various terms connected with retention
behavior, such as "first termer," "careerist," and "career reenlist-
ment," will be used. The definitions used are coincident with the
Department of Navy definitions as contained in Navy Military Personnel
Statistics (NAVPERS 15658) are are summarized below:
1 . Pay Grade
Each person in the U.S. military is paid according to his or
her level, or paygrade. Enlisted pay grades run from E-l to E-10;
officer pay grades from 0-1 to 0-10. Within each paygrade are sub-
levels divided by length of service, for example "an E-4 over 4" means
a person of paygrade E-4 having over 4 years of active military service.
Compiled from age distribution tables in NAVPERS 15658.
In a study of first term reenlistment, Chow and Polich [Ref. 13]
showed that for their cohort of 1976 service members, their findings
would not differ significantly if they did not try to control for the




A rating is an occupation specialty made up of duties calling
for closely related skills, abilities and aptitudes. The rating called
Quartermaster, for example, encompasses the skills of celestial,
terrestial, and electronic navigation; chart administration, and ship
control seamanship. There are currently 110 ratings in use. New ratings
are instituted when new equipment or new skills are required of an en-
listed man such as the Gas Turbine Engineer rating which was created
when the Navy started to use gas turbines as main propulsion systems
of ships.
3. Rate
A rate is a combination of rating and paygrade. It identifies
a person's occupation and level of attainment. Quartermaster rates
vary from Master Chief Quartermaster (QMCM) down to Quartermaster Third
Class (QM3).
4. Petty Officer
Naval enlisted personnel who have attained the pay grade E-4
are petty officers. A petty officer is classified and assigned by
his/her rating and pay grade. For virtually all Navy members, this
is the level at which both authority and responsibility are first con-
ferred. The petty officer titles are as follows:
Pay Grade Title
E-4 Third Class Petty Officer
E-5 Second Class Petty Officer
E-6 First Class Petty Officer
E-7 Chief Petty Officer
E-8 Senior Chief Petty Officer
E-9 Master Chief Petty Officer
33

5. First Term, Enlisted (First Termer)
An individual who is serving on an initial enlistment in the
regular Navy, which may be for 4 or 6 years.
6. First Term Reenlistee
This is an individual who has completed an initial enlistment
contract in the regular Navy, is discharged and reenlists in the regular
Navy within 90 days following discharge. In order to reenlist one must
first be discharged. Most frequently the discharge and reenlistment
occur in the same ceremony. A person may also be discharged prior to
the end of the initial enlistment contract for purposes of immediate
reenlistment.
7. Career Reenlistee
This is an individual who reenlists for a second or subsequent
time. The individual obligates himself for a third or subsequent en-
listment contract.
8. Careerist
An individual making at least one career reenlistment is called
a careerist.
9. Extension of Enlistment (Extension)
An individual may extend a current enlistment contract up to
4 years. While a bonus may be given for a reenlistment, no bonus is
given for an extension of less than 3 years. An extension might be
preferable for some individuals since a transfer to a new duty station
does not normally follow an extension as it does for an reenlistment.
10. End of Active Obligated Service (EAOS)
The terminal date of an enlistment contract or extension is






This is the measure of pecuniary returns just sufficient to
induce an individual to reenlist. The reservation wage compensates an
individual not only for foregone civilian pecuniary returns, but also
for substituting military non-pecuniary benefits for those in the
civilian world.
12. Reenlistment Rate
This is the rate at which those who are eligible to reenlist
do so or extend for 24 or more months.
Reenlistments + Extensions of 24 or more months
.
Reenlistment
Eligibles at EAOS " Rate
13. Retention Rate
The rate at which all personnel, both eligible and ineligible,
either reenlist or extend 24 or more months is the retention rate.
Reenlistments + Extensions of 24 or more months
_
Retention
All Personnel at EAOS Rate
C. GROUPING THE NAVY RATINGS
To conduct this study with as many data points as possible, quarterly
reenlistment data are used. This is the shortest time period for which
reenlistment data are easily obtainable, However, using quarterly data
for most ratings means that the number of career eligibles and reenlistees
in a rating are quite small, frequently less than 20 individuals.
Therefore, it is necessary to group ratings by a method that would not
only result in cells having a larger number of observations, but which
would also maintain cell homogeniety.
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Several methods exist for grouping the 110 Navy ratings. The Chief
of Naval Personnel (CHNAVPERS) groups all ratings into 10 sets when
summarizing reenlistment statistics in NAVPERS 15658. The groups are:
Deck, Engineering and Hull, Construction, Ordnance, Precision,
Electronics, Administrative, Aviation, Miscellaneous, and Medical. This
is basically the method used by Reedy [Ref. 9] in her analysis of first
term reenlistment. The fault with this grouping method is that
CHNAVPERS personnel policy is not made on the basis of these groups.
A second method has been adopted by the Deputy Chief of Naval
Personnel for Manpower, Personnel, and Training (OP-01). Each Navy
rating is grouped into one of 14 "communities." Ratings within each
community are similar in skill requirements and functions involving
operation and maintenance of related equipment. As can be seen in
Table 2, each community is given a general title roughly describing
the ratings' activities. Each community is under a separate staff's
cognizance, called the Enlisted Community Manager (ECM). The ECM is
responsible for monitoring the training pipeline and population of each
rating in his community. As will be seen, the grouping scheme is
similar to the official Navy Department method, but contains fewer
groups and therefore does not discriminate as finely among the ratings.
It is felt by OP-01 that one staff headed by an 0-5 can successfully
monitor 6 to 9 ratings. Some ratings have been changed from one
community to another in order to balance out the ECM's workload. The
ECM's do not make policy decisions concerning the welfare or strength
of their communities. Rather, they act as liaison between the many




















DS, EW, FT, GM, OS, STG,
DP, ET, OT, RM
BM, HT, IM, ML, MR, OM,
PI, PM, QM, SM
FTB, MN, MT, STS, TM
AG, AIRCREW, AW, AX, AZ,
PH
AC, AE, AQ, AT, AV, TD
AB, AD, AF, AM, AO, AS,
PR
CTA, CTI, CTM, CTO, CTR,
CTT
DM, IS, JO, LI, LN, MU,
PC, PN, RP, YN
AK, DK, MS, SH, SK
DT, HM




Source: Navy Enlisted Community Manager's Manual
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as the Chief of Naval Personnel, Chief of Naval Training, Chief of
Naval Recruiting, to name a few. For this reason it was decided not
to use the OP-01 method to group ratings for this study.
A third method for grouping ratings is used by the Chief of Naval
Recruiting in the U.S. Navy Enlisted Career Guide [Ref. 14]. The guide
is published for use by local recruiters and is available to schools
and guidance counselors. To facilitate its use, Navy ratings are
grouped similarly to the system used in the Occupational Outlook
Handbook published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics [Ref. 15]. Ratings with similar characteristics are again
grouped together, as can be seen in Table 3. This grouping scheme
was not used in this thesis since it is done only to aid recruiters
and potential recruits.
During the period of July 1973 to January 1974, an extensive
3
review of the enlisted classification system was conducted. The
study's purpose was to evaluate the existing system and make recom-
mendations as to the skills required for each rating and the actual
number and type of ratings which should exist. After analysis of each
rating, the study formulated a plan to consolidate a number of indepen-
dent ratings on the basis of commonality and similarity of skills.
The existing ratings were grouped into 24 homogeneous occupational
fields. Although the consolidation plan has not been adopted, the
24 occupational field scheme has remained. The grouping of ratings





OCCUPATIONAL GROUPING METHOD USED BY THE















AZ, AK, CTA, DK, PN, RP,
SK, YN
CTO, DM, IS, JO, LI, MU,
PH, RM, SM




AD, AO, AM, AS, BT, CM,
EN, MR, MM
AG, AW, AX, AE, AQ, CTR,
CTI, CTM, CTT, DS, EM, ET,
EW, FT, GS, GM, IM, IC, MN,
OT, OS, OM, ST, TM, TD
MS, PC, SH
PR, AC, AB, BM, QM
LN, MA, NC
EOD, Special Warfare, Navy Diver
Source: Navy Recruiting Manual [Ref. 16].
Note: Although all 110 ratings are not written above, all are
implied. That is, the GM rating contains the ratings GMG,
GMM, GMT; the ET rating contains ETR, ETN. These three
letter ratings are in effect for E-4 to E-5. When an
individual reaches E-6, the third letter is usually dropped,
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in the fields was done on the basis of a blending of skills between
ratings that had occurred over the years. The titles of the fields
are closely related to functions performed aboard ship, in aircraft
squadrons, and in shore activities. They are descriptive of the work
men and women actually do, and they follow the systems concept. Table
4 lists the occupational fields and their associated ratings.
The study group defined a system as an "assemblage of equipment,
documentation, and trained personnel having regular interaction and
interdependence and geared toward support of one or more major command
functions." An occupational field encompasses all ratings which may
reasonably be required to man and support the system to which it is
aligned.
The occupational field method results in the most homogeneous
groups of all the methods researched. It is the result of a full-
scale Navy sponsored study of the Navy Enlisted Classification System.
This is the grouping method selected for use in this study. An
additional advantage is that Navy sponsored research is currently
underway using the occupational field scheme in a study of first term
5
reenlistment.
Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) Study,
Vol. 1, p. 17.
c
Naval Personnel Research Development Center, San Diego, is
conducting a study of how first term reenlistment is related to in-
service experience. Data on reenlistment and experiences are being













































































D. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE - CAREER REENLISTMENT RATE
Career reenlistment data were taken from the quarterly publication
NAVY MILITARY PERSONNEL STATISTICS (NAVPERS 15658). This publication
has a section entitled "USN Reenlistment Data, First Term and Career
Personnel." For each rating, the number eligible (ELIG REEN), number
of reenlistments (NO. REEN) and the reenlistment rate (REEN RATE) is
given for each of the 9 categories shown below:







Total PO E-9 + ... + E-4
Strikers E-l + E-2 + E-3
Total PO + Strikers






REEN = reenlistments executed within 90 days of EAOS +
number of extensions for 24 or more months
ELIG REEN = number eligible to reenlist prior to expiration
of service + number eligible at expiration of
service + number of extensions for 24 more months.
Personnel are not counted twice. For example, a person who is
eligible to reenlist but extends is only counted as an extension.
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The reenlistment data in MAVPERS 15658 are presented only for
the fiscal year's total to date. Data are presented for first term,
career and total personnel.
Since quarterly data were desired it was necessary to subtract
the previous quarter's cumulative data for the eligibles and reenlistees
for each rating. The ratings were then grouped by occupational field
and reenlistment rates were computed for each field. Appendix A shows
the resultant reenlistment rates. The numbers in parenthesis are the
number of eligibles in each occupational field for each quarter 1976-
1980. The aggregrate quarterly reenlistment rate was computed by
dividing the total quarterly career reenlistments by the total number
of eligible persons in each quarter.
E. PREDICTORS FOR REENLISTMENT
1 o Career Regular Military Compensation (CRMC)
There is no uniform agreement on exactly which combination
of the many components of military compensation is most representa-
tive of an individual's perceived compensation. Various schemes for
constructing a military pay variable were discussed in Chapter II.
One of the problems encountered in reviewing previous methods was in
obtaining precise definitions of the pay variables. There is
agreement, however, that base pay is the most significant component
of military compensation [Refs. 1 , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. This component
not only reflects the individual's pay grade but also approximate
time in service. Automatic increases in base pay occur at the 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 and 18 year points.
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The base pay component required a determination of the most
representative time in service interval for the careerist pay grades,
E-6 to E-9. For two sample years, 1976 and 1980, the time in service
of each enlisted person on active duty was tabulated and it was found
that 90% of all E-6 to E-9 personnel in both years have between 8 and
26 years of service. It was assumed that this percent did not change
significantly during the years between 1976 and 1980.
To calculate an estimate of CRMC, the proportion of the career
force in each of the pay-grades E-6 to E-9 had to be determined.
The number in each paygrade was divided by the total force for fiscal
years 1976 and 1980, The resulting proportions are shown in Table 5.
These proportions were used to weight the average base pay for each
paygrade. The careerist base pay component was formed by summing
these weighted base pays.
TABLE 5
PROPORTION OF CAREER FORCE BY PAYGRADE
1976 AND 1980























xi = Base pay given i years of service
Y = Number of different base pay categories, 6 for E-6,
8 for E-7, E-8, and E-9
i = Base pay increment categories, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18,
20, 22 years of service
The difference in denominators between E-6 and E-7/8/9 is because
an E-6 receives only 6 pay increases due to time in service, while
E-7 and above receive 8. Less than five percent of all E-6's have
over 20 years of service, whereas 25, 46, and 77 percent of E-7/8/9
personnel have over 20 years time in service, respectively.
The next compensation component considered was the basic allowance
for quarters (BAQ) amount., BAQ differs considerably depending on
whether the service member has dependents. For example, an E-6
without dependents in 1976 received $136,50; with dependents $213.50,
Table 6 shows the percent of E-6 to E-9's receiving full BAQ during
the period 1969 to 1980. The 1976 to 1980 percentages were used as
weights in computing the appropriate BAQ component of military com-
pensation. The percentages for 1969 to 1975 are shown in the table to
show the stability of the percentages over the past eleven years.
Average percentages over all quarters of the study. Computed




PROPORTION OF E-6 TO E-9 RECEIVING FULL BAQ*
Fiscal Year E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 AVG
1969 86.3 93.8 96.1 96.6 93.2
1970 87.3 84.1 96.3 96.2 93.5
1971 88.0 94.4 96.5 96.5 93.9
1972 87.9 93.9 95.8 96.3 93.5
1973 89.2 93.7 96.0 96.0 93.7
1974 90.8 95.2 96.9 97.5 95.1
1975 84.9 89.0 90.9 91.6 89.1
1976 88.9 92.9 95.3 95.3 93.1
1977 90.1 95.0 97.1 97.4 94.9
1978 89.8 94.9 97.1 97.8 94.9
1979 89.2 94.9 97.1 97.5 94.7
1980 88.0 94.6 96.7 97.8 94.3
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California
A person receiving "full BAQ" necessarily has one or more dependents
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The 1973 BAQ component for paygrade E-6 was computed as follows:
(E-6 BAQ with dependents) x (1973 pet E-6 with dependents)
($150.00) x (.892) = $133.80
(E-6 BAQ w/o dependents) x (1973 pet of E-6 w/o dependents)
($95.70) x (.108) = $ 10.33
1973 BAQ component for E-6 $144.13
The next compensation question was how to account for other com-
ponents of military compensation such as sea pay, flight pay, sub-
marine pay, hazardous duty pay, diving pay, proficiency pay, reenlist-
ment bonuses still being paid by installments, commuted rations,
family separation allowance, uniform maintenance allowance and the
tax advantage on allowances. In addition, non-pecuniary considerations
such as exchange and commissary privileges, medical care, low cost
life insurance and low cost recreational services may be viewed as a
part of compensation. Since no individual service member receives all
of these components at once, a method of standardizing these compensa-
tions had to be computed.
In considering the pecuniary candidates it is impossible to
determine by occupational rate alone which of the pays a service
member receives. An Operational Specialist can receive sea pay, sub-
marine pay, hazardous duty pay, diving pay, proficiency pay or a
combination of these pays. To determine the frequency of each pay
among all careerists for each quarter would involve investigation of
each and every service record. It would be extremely time consuming
and laborious to investigate every service record to obtain data on
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all the special pays an individual receives. In addition to this
difficulty, it would be of questionable value. Up until October 1980,
the magnitude of these special pays was quite small in relation to
base pay and BAQ so the average addition to everyone's pay would be
quite small. The sole exception to the above argument might be in the
receiving of flight pay by some individuals in the aviation occupation-
al fields. Unfortunately, it is as difficult to determine how many
individuals in the aviation fields are in flying billets as it is to
determine how many in the general seamanship field are on sea duty.
It is therefore a key assumption of this study that the receivers
and non-receivers of the special pays are distributed evenly over the
occupational fields and that the net effect of including the pays
would not significantly alter the effect on reenlistment rates of
the magnitude or variation of the constructed military compensation
variable over the 20 quarter time period of this study. The October,
1980, pay hike added two components of pay, Career Sea Pay and
Variable Housing Allowance, which do change the distribution of RMC
significantly. A future extension of this research may be able to
take those special pays into account,,
The non-pecuniary components of military pay were not used for
reasons similar to those for the special pay components. The frequency
of use of the available shopping and recreational facilities could
not be reliably estimated.
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The 1973 CRMC is calculated below as an example:
E-6 base pay average for time in service 8 to 20 = $612.35
E-6 BAQ component = $144.13
Total $756.48
(1973 E-6 component of CRMC) x (E-6 proportion of
the career force)
(756.48) (,613) = $463.72
The same computation is done for E-7 to E-9 with the following results
1973 E-6 component = $463.72
1973 E-7 component = $242.31
1973 E-8 component = $ 72.79
1973 E-9 component = $ 29.88
Total 1973 CRMC $808.70
Table 7 shows the CRMC computed for years 1976 to 1980. As can be
seen in this table, money CRMC increased almost 28% from fiscal year
1976 to fiscal year 1980.
An additional consideration in the military compensation variable
was to account for the periodic service-wide pay increases. The
yearly pay increase is usually effective as of the beginning of the
fiscal year. The beginning of the fiscal year was changed in 1976
from 1 July to 1 October. The actual occurrence of the yearly pay
increases over the years 1976 was investigated and used in the mili-













A final consideration in developing the CRMC variable was to
account for the effect of nationwide inflation upon military pay.
Table 7 shows that military compensation has increased and Appendix A
shows that career retention, in general, has declined. This implies
an inverse relationship. Logically, an increase in compensation
should result in an increase in retention. It was necessary to
convert yearly dollars into real dollars to show the difference in
buying power that has occurred over the period of the study.
The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
[Ref. 18] deflates earnings data to constant 1967 dollars using the
seasonally adjusted consumer price index (CPI). The CPI measures
price changes in the total of goods and services purchased by urban
single and family wage earners and clerical workers. Basic and ad-
justed data for the price index are published by the BLS which also
provides the seasonal adjustment factors used to adjust the index.
50

A purchasing power index was created from the "consumers prices,
all items" index by dividing the middle month index value for each
quarter into the middle month CPI index of the third quarter for FY
1980. These values are in column two Table 8. As indicated, a
hundred dollars in 1976-1 had the same purchasing power as 150 dollars
in 1980-3. The actual CRMC was multiplied by the purchasing power
index to obtain the adjusted CRMC. As can be seen in Table 8, the
adjusted CRMC shows a general decline of real wages over the period
1976 - 1981 which follows the logical relationship of compensation
to retention. Table 8 indicates that real CRMC decreased over 15%
from fiscal year 1976 to FY 1980.
In order to use CRMC as a predictor variable for FY 1980-4 and
FY 1981-1, the relatively large increase in military compensation due
to the institution of Career Sea Pay (CSP) and Variable Housing
Allowance (VHA) was taken into account. Precise weighting of the
various levels of CSP and VHA among the career pay grades was not
done at the level that base pay and BAQ were. Instead, it was con-
servatively estimated that the average careerist has between 2 and
5 years of sea duty, and receives some VHA. Since the October 1980
pay raise was well publicized in the quarter prior, it was estimated
that careerists made their reenlistment decision with a perceived
CSP and VHA in FY 1980-4. Accordingly, before accounting for infla-





E-6 TO E-9 CRMC ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION BY QUARTER
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The civilian unemployment rate for males between 25 and 39
years old was chosen as the variable most representative of the
civilian job opportunity environment faced by the career petty officer.
It has already been established that over 90 percent of careerists
have at least one dependent. A petty officer leaving the service
prior to, at or after the 20 year point will therefore probably seek
further employment to support his family. By definition, a careerist
has at least 7 years of active duty and only a very small percentage
have over 26 years. Table 9 shows that 85.03 percent of careerists
are between the ages of 25 and 39. A person who enlisted at age 18
would be in his/her seventh year of active duty at age 25. If a
careerist left the service at the 20 year point, he/she would be in
his/her 39th year. Since the percentage of females meeting the
careerist definition did not exceed one percent during the period
1973-1980, it was decided to use civilian male unemployment data for
age group 25-39 as the appropriate civilian unemployment variable.
TABLE 9
E-6 TO E-9 AGE DISTRIBUTION FY 1976 + FY 1980
Age Group Number in Group Percent of Total







Over 54 4646 2.17
Total 214668 100.00
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California
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Data were available for age groups 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39. The
25-39 unemployment rate was computed by taking a simple average of
the rates for the three age groups. Table 10 shows unemployment by
age distribution by quarters for 1973-1980.
TABLE 10
CIVILIAN MALE UNEMPLOYMENT BY AGE GROUP
FY-QTR 25-29 30-34 35-39 25-39*
1976-1 7.60 5.00 4.47 5.69
1976-2 7.07 5.10 4.63 5.60
1976-3 8.27 6.23 5.23 6.58
1976-4 6.50 4.83 4.13 5.15
197T 6.83 4.43 3.87 5.04
1977-1 7.00 4.50 4.13 5.21
1977-2 8.87 5.27 4.87 6.34
1977-3 6.40 4.30 3.33 4.68
1977-4 5.83 4.30 2.90 4.34
1978-1 5.43 4.17 3.13 4.24
1978-2 6.57 4.47 3.53 4.86
1978-3 4.70 3.10 3.07 3.62
1978-4 4.63 2.77 2o43 3.28
1979-1 4,95 3.10 2„55 3,53
1979-2 6.17 3.90 3.20 4.42
1979-3 4.30 3.13 2.60 3.34
1979-4 4.27 3.27 2.77 3.44
1980-1 4.67 3.33 3.20 3.73
1980-2 4.87 5 73 4.43 5.01










Computed by averaging the 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 rates
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3. Indicators of Civilian Economic Conditions Other Than
Unemployment
The perceived value of a person's potential civilian earnings
may have an effect on his reenlistment decision. It is desirable,
therefore, to develop variables that would represent the civilian
wages available. Obviously the perfect case would be where one knew
exactly what wage each and every careerist would make if he/she left
the service. This data is impossible to obtain and in any case it
would be used to construct an average for all careerists in each
occupational field. The least precise measure would be the mean
national wage found by aggregating over all civilian occupations.
Two measures of civilian earnings conditions were considered in this
study: Index of all services less rent and average weekly earnings
in selected civilian occupations.
a. Index of All Services Less Rent (SVCS)
The index of all services less rent was used by Bradley
(1980) as a proxy for change in civilian wages. The index was
developed by using a consumer price index of services tabulated in
the Economic Report of the President, published annually. The index,
as it appears in the publication, is calculated by pricing the
services that people buy for day to day living such as medical, home
and auto maintenance, postal charges, utilities, property taxes,
and insurances [Ref. 11]. Price changes for these items are averaged
for major U.S. cities and 28 rural locations. Since the index of all
services less rent excludes prices of rents and mortgages, the
majority of the items comprising the index are services that are
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supplied by personal labor. Changes in this index become a proxy for
changes in wage that a careerist might receive if he/she decides not
to reenlist, but rather to enter the civilian job environment. Table
11 shows the index computed quarterly from FY 1973 to FY 1980 with
the third quarter FY 1980 equalling 100.
TABLE 11
INDEX OF ALL SERVICES LESS RENT
























b. Average Weekly Earnings in Selected Private, Non-Agricultural
Industries (EARN)
Even though a careerist who leaves the service carries
experience, leadership ability and maturity, he/she may very well be
initially be given a non-supervisory position by a civilian employer.
It may be reasonable to assume that a new employee would have to prove
to his/her employer that he/she does, in fact, possess skills trans-
ferable from the military.
The yearly Economic Report of the President [Ref. 19]
lists the average gross weekly earnings for production or non-super-
visory workers for eight major civilian occupation fields: manufacturing,
construction, retail trade, mining, transportation, public utilities,
finance, insurance and real estate.
The NEOCS grouping of the occupational fields utilized
navy specific rationale of similar work components such as similar
skills, similar duty assignments, similar working conditions and
similar watch stations. Civilian counterparts to navy ratings were
not explicitly used as a grouping method in the NEDCS study. This
study will utilize an aggregate measure of average gross weekly
earnings instead of a civilian job specific or industry specific
measure. Future research may investigate the relationship between
military and civilian jobs and apply the similar jobs' earnings as
civilian wages of navy jobs.
Table 12 shows the average gross weekly earnings index






























4. Relative Wages (RW)
A method of combining the possible effects on career retention
behavior of changes in either military compensation or alternative
wages is to utilize the ratio of military to civilian pay as a single
explanatory variable. The career petty officer at a reenlistment
decision point might investigate the pay scale of civilian jobs re-
quiring similar skills to his military occupation. A ratio of total
military compensation to total civilian compensation, including
quantified non-pecuniary aspects of both, is the ideal ratio. An
increasing ratio should result in a correspondingly increasing re-
enlistment rate.
A military/civilian pay ratio was computed by Bradley using
his CRMC and Mean National Wages. The Mean National Wage was ad-
justed to include some fringe benefits in order to make civilian
wages reflect some of the non-paycheck benefits in his compensation.
Reedy [Ref. 8] constructed her relative wage variable for first
termers by using base pay for E-4's with less than four years of
service, divided by private sector non-agricultural wages for
production or non-supervisory personnel. A related variable which
recognized the value of indirect financial benefits was based upon
the RMC for E-4's with less than four years of service. Her RMC in-
cluded quarters and subsistence allowances and the tax advantage
associated with them, as well as base pay. The latter was less
Bradley used data taken from the same table used by this study,
Average Gross Weekly Earnings.
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effective for the sample over which it was tested, and Reedy inferred
that base pay is the major component of military compensation con-
sidered by the typical first termenlistee.
The relative wage variable constructed for this study takes
CRMC divided by 4 to obtain a weekly CRMC, then divides that by the
average gross weekly earnings amount for production or non-supervisory
workers used to construct the earnings index. Table 13 shows the
ratio of military to civilian wages. For the period 1976-1 to 1980-3
the military/civilian wage ratio decreased by just over five percent.
F. PREDICTING CAREER RETENTION USING MASSELL'S EQUATION
An alternative method, following Massell's work [Ref. 5], for
predicting career retention is to calculate the reservation wage for
each occupational group and to determine the probability of reenlist-
ment for each.
The equations used for computation of the reservation wage and
the probability of reenlistment were discussed in Chapter II. Linear
regression equations are developed for each occupational field re-
enlistment rate, and for the aggregate reenlistment rate using the
adjusted CRMC as the single explanatory variable. While Massell used
historic reenlistment data for just one year, FY 1972, this study uses
the twenty calendar quarter time series. Once the reservation wage is































G. METHOD OF LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND MODEL VALIDATION
1
.
Stepwise or Hierarchical Regression
There are two basic methods of adding independent variables
into a multiple linear regression model equation. In the stepwise
method the independent variables are entered according to their con-
tribution to the overall coefficient of determination, R square.
Using this method the change in importance of the same variable across
the 24 occupational fields can be readily seen. In the second method,
the hierarchical method, variables are added to the regression
equation in an order determined by the researcher. For this study,
it is assumed that there exists no intrinsic order to the occurrence
of the independent variables in society, therefore, stepwise regression
is used throughout.
2. Model Validation
Three specific steps will be performed to validate the
developed predictive models: (1) a measure of the goodness of fit of
the overall model will be calculated, (2) tests for the statistical
significance of individual variables in each model will be accomplished
and, (3) the models will be tested on actual reenlistment rates not
used in developing the equations.
The goodness of fit test involves testing the null hypothesis
that the equations are not significant at the .05 level. The F
statistic of each equation is used to determine the significance
level. The R square statistic is used to describe the amount of
variance in the reenlistment rate that is explained by each model.
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The significance test for each of the independent variables
involves using the F statistic to test the null hypothesis that the
variable is not significant at the .05 level.
In the third test, the predicted reenlistment rate is found by
using the models to predict the career reenlistment rates for quarters
FY 1980-4 and FY 1981-1. A model for an occupational field is con-
sidered successful by this researcher if it predicts the reenlistment
rate for each calendar quarter within + 5% of the actual rate.
3. Omission of Selected Occupational Fields
Occupational fields containing less than 50 persons eligible
for reenlistment in an average quarter were deleted from further
study. An individual decision to reenlist or not has more of an
effect on these smaller occupational fields and might result in mis-
leading conclusions about general group behavior. The following
occupational fields were therefore omitted: Air Traffic Control,
Weapons System Support, Musicians, Master-at-Arms, Intelligence,
Meteorology, and Aviation Sensor Operations.
The remaining 17 occupational fields and the aggregate rating
group each contain different amounts of eligibles and reenlistees.
To indicate the usefulness of each model, the percentage of the
FY 1981-1 career force working in the ratings covered by the successful
models is mentioned in the results.
4. Models Developed
Prediction equations are developed for each of the 17 occupa-
tional fields and the aggregate reenlistment rate. In evaluating any
model two points were considered: how well does the model fit the
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historic data, and how well does it predict future reenlistment
rates? If policy analysis is the purpose of a modeling effort,
then validity as measured by goodness of fit to historic data is
important. If prediction is the purpose, then causally incorrect
or incomplete models can still be valuable if they predict well.
The models developed in this thesis are judged on both points.
Single variable models are developed using CRMC, then
unemployment as the explanatory variables. Massell's model, a
variation on single variable models, is then evaluated as to its
predictive value. The final model uses the best military/civilian




A. SINGLE VARIABLE MODELS
1. CRMC
CRMC is the inflation adjusted value of Career Military Compensa-
tion. As shown in Table 16, CRMC as the sole explanatory variable results
2
in R 's between .01 and .42 for predicting careerist retention in the
occupational fields. Only 1 of the 18 models has an R greater than
.40; that being the model for Aviation Ground Support, which contains
only 2.2% of the personnel in the FY 1981-1 career force. Table 14 also
shows that in only 2 occupational fields, Ship's Operations and Health
Care are the predictions of the FY 1980-4 and FY 1981-1 retention rates
within + 5% in both calendar quarters. The mean error for the 18 models
is 9.3%.
CRMC alone appears to have neither good explanatory value nor
predictive usefulness. This is not surprising, in that the true value
of compensation to a service member needs to reflect the opportunity
cost of military service. CRMC by itself does not reveal whether the
person is in a better or worse financial situation than he might be if
he left the service. A compensation variable incorporating a measure
of civilian wage alternatives should prove to predict better past re-
enlistment behavior and to be a better predictor of future behavior.
2. Unemployment
When 25-39 the year old male unemployment rate is used as the
2
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which have an R greater than .40. comprise 58% of the 1st Quarter of FY
1981 (FY 1981-1) career force. Unemployment has a significant coefficient
at the .05 level or higher in 13 of the 18 models. The FY 1980-4 and
FY 1981-1 career retention rates for four fields are successfully pre-
dicted with + 5% of the actual rates. These fields, Aviation Maintenance/
Weapons, Health, Logistics, and Communications, include 37% of the
personnel in the FY 1981-1 career force. The mean error of prediction
is 8.5%. Table 15 summarizes the results of unemployment as a single
explanatory variable.
Unemployment, specific to the age group which contains career
petty officers, has a better fit to historic reenlistment data and is a
substantially better predictor of future career retention than CRMC alone.
This result suggests that the opportunity for employment in the civilian
job market affects the career reenlistments of middle grade and senior
enlisted personnel more than the fluctuations in their military compen-
sation. Previous studies, £Refs. 6, 7, 9, 10] recognized the significance
of unemployment, however, none attempted to narrow the unemployment to
a specific age group or use it as a single explanatory variable.
The unemployment rate for this study was not lagged. Future
research, might use various time lags to attempt to correspond with the
employment rates publicized by the media. An increase in significant
or predictive value of the unemployment variable when lagged might lead
to the conclusion that career reenlistments are largely based on the
perception of civilian job. opportunities as seen in the media, rather
than by actually searching for a civilian job. The performance of the
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3. Application of Massell's Probability Model
Massell's model results in an improvement in prediction over
CRMC. It predicts successfully in more occupational fields than did
the unemployment variable but these fields include less of the total
force. The model predicts with + 5% - the career retention rates for
both FY 1980-4 and FY 1981-1 in 5 of 17 fields: General Seamanship,
Aviation Ground Support, Administration, Logistics, and Communications,
These fields represent 27% of personnel in the FY 1981-1 career force.
The prediction for the aggregate is only 2.7% high for FY 1980-4, and
5.4% high for FY 1981-1
. The mean error of prediction is 8.6%,
essentially the same as the mean error when unemployment is used as
the sole explanatory variable. Table 16 shows the results for Massell's
model
.
Since the model makes use of CRMC as the sole explanatory
variable, in a linear regression equation it has the same R and signi-
ficance as the CRMC-only model. The fact that the predictive value is
increased is interesting and bears further analysis.
The reservation wage used by the model may be an accurate re-
flection of the civilian returns, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
available to enlisted men. In a sense, therefore, this model is similar
to a relative wage model although military compensation is the only
actual required input. Since the reservation wage concept reflects both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation, the model might be an even
better forecaster if the military compensation input included both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary portions. The difficulty of properly














General Seamanship 78.4 83.6 3.7 -0.8
Ship's Operations 76.4 80.7 7.2 -4.0
Marine Engineering 71.6 76.3 15,6 12.3
Ship's Maintenance 76.8 82.9 8.3 0.9
Aviation Maint/Weaps 74.3 79.6 15.0 17.9
Aviation Ground
Support 76.6 82.9 -0.1 0.7
Weapons Control 66.0 61.7 38.4 10.7
Ordnance Systems 76.8 77.4 2.5 -9.6
Sensor Operations 69.9 72.1 24.8 16.1
Data Systems 71.1 76.2 19.1 20.9
Construction 78.5 81,4 -5.6 -16.9
Health 76.4 78.4 8.2 4.5
Administration 78 3 82.2 -2.9 -3.8
Logistics 80.1 86.0 -3.5 -0.4
Medi a 77.6 79.6 0.9 -7.0
Crypto logy 75.7 71.1 0.9 -11.1
Communications 76.6 79.2 0.5 0.5
Aggregate Ratings 74.8 78.0 2.7 5.4
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however. An interesting comparison would be the computed reservation
wage and the actual civilian compensation of newly released service
members. Massell made this comparison for a small scale for the air
force electronics repairmen and specialists. She found that the reser-
vation wage was higher than either military or civilian wages. This
fact may be reflecting a common perception of both civilian personnel
and military personnel that they are somewhat underpaid. A subject of
future research may be to expand the study of reservation wage by in-
vestigating its magnitude in jobs with low turnover. In that case, of
course, one would expect the probability of continuation on the job to
be greater than o 50.
B. MILITARY/CIVILIAN WAGE RATIO
One method of reflecting the opportunity cost of military service
is to construct a relative wage ratio. In addition to the Relative Wage
variable discussed in Chapter III, two more wage ratios were constructed.
The first used CRMC as the numerator and the Index of All Services Less
Rent (SVCS) as the demoninator The second used CRMC as the numerator
and the Average Gross Weekly Earnings Index as the denominator.
The Index of All Services, as discussed in section II.E.2.a. is a
price index with the third quarter, Fiscal Year 1980 as the base, equalling
100. The Average Gross Weekly Earnings Index, discussed in II.E.2.b, is
also an index with FY 1980-3 equalling 100. This weekly earnings index,
however, is constructed from actual dollar earning amounts. These dollar
amounts are not adjusted for purchasing power changes as is CRMC. In-
tuitively, the Relative Wage Variable {RU} discussed in I I.E. 4 is the
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most logical, since both the numerator and denominator are dollar amounts,
purchasing power adjusting index.
To determine the best relative wage variable for use in the final
model, the intercorrelations among the 3 relative wage variables and the
dependent variable were examined,, The career retention rate for the
aggregate ratings was used as the dependent variable in these correla-
tions. Table 17 displays the resultant matrix.
TABLE 17




SVCS EARN RW Rate
CRMC
SVCS
1.00 .99 .77 .60
CRMC
EARN
.99 1.0 .79 .65
RW .77 .79 1.0 .68
Aggregate
Reenlistment .60 .65 .68 1.0
Rate
As can be seen from the Table, the Relative Wage Variable (RW) of
military dollars to civilian dollars has the highest correlation with
the aggregate reenlistment date, and is therefore used in the final
model, with unemployment as the second explanatory variable.
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C RELATIVE WAGES AND 25-39 YR OLD MALE UNEMPLOYMENT
The final model developed in this thesis was relative military com-
pensation and the unemployment rate for males 25-39 years old as the
explanatory variable. This model results in occupation field R '
s
p
ranging from .06 to 62. The R 's greater than .40 occur in fields
that employ 63% of the personnel in the FY 1981-1 career enlisted force.
The model is significant at the .05 level or higher in 11 occupational
fields and for the aggregate careerist reenlistment rate. Table 18
summarizes the model's fit across the occupational fields.
This model exhibits the best fit to past reenlistment rates of the
linear regression models used in this study. The fact that three
variables are used, even though two are combined in a ratio (relative
military compensation) probably accounts for this better fit. As with
the models using CRMC and unemployment as single explanatory variables,
the operational fields which contain the larger populations show the
2highest R 's and significance levels. This may be occurring because
in the larger fields an individual decision has less of an effect on
the group average, so a smoothing occurs.
Also, the larger occupation fields generally contain more individual
ratings in them. An effect on the occupational field's average re-
enlistment rate by a single rating is much smaller than in the small
occupational fields such as cryptology or communications. For example,
a change in the sea/shore rotation policy for the radioman rating might
greatly affect the Communications occupation field, which contains only














General Seamanship .10 .10 .01 .55
Ship's Operations .25 .025 .01 .60
Marine Engineering NS .025 .01 .59
Ship's Maintenance .05 NS .025 .44
Aviation Maint/Weps .25 ,05 .01 .61
Aviation Ground
Support .10 .05 .01 .62
Weapons Control NS o 05 .05 .22
Ordnance Systems NS NS NS .02
Sensor OPS NS NS NS .13
Data Systems NS NS .25 .23
Construction NS .05 .01 .42
Health .25 NS .25 .19
Administration NS .25 .05 ,33
Logistics .05 .10 .01 .57
Cryptology .25 NS .10 ,25
Communications NS .25 .025 .37
Aggregate .25 .10 .01 .56
*RW is defined as weekly CRMC divided by average gross weekly (civilian)
earnings.
Unemployment is defined as 25-39 yr old male unemployment.
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affect the Ship's Maintenance occupational field to a much lesser
degree, since many other ratings are also in that field.
To use the model to predict reenlistment rates for FY 1980-4 and
FY 1981-1 we need the values of military/civilian pay and unemployment
for those quarters. The monthly values for real CRMC are $1330 for
FY 1980-4 and $1574 for FY 1981-1. The Average Gross Weekly Earnings
dollar amounts for FY 1980-4 = $235, FY 1981-1 = $246.
Multiplying the civilian earnings by the purchasing power adjust-
ment index and dividing the result into weekly CRMC the derived RW
ratios are 1.44 for FY 1980-4 and 1.67 for FY 1981-1. The unemployment
values for the two quarters are 4.7 for FY 1980-4 and 5.0 for
g
FY 1981-1. Table 19 summarizes the results of using the model to
predict career retention rates.
The model overpredicts the career retention rate in both quarters
in 15 of the 18 cases. In no case does it predict within + 5% for
both quarters. This result indicates that, according to this model,
we would have expected even higher retention rates than actually oc-
curred in 1980-4 and 1981-1. The CRMC for FY 1980-4, which was es-
timated at $1330, represented a 10.2% increase in real wages from the
previous quarter. The FY 1981-1 CRMC, at $1574, represented an in-
crease of 18.3% in real wages over FY 1980-4. Since the effect of VHA
and Career Sea Pay were conservatively estimated at $150 for FY 1980-4
and FY 1981-1, it is possible that the increase in real wages was
g
Unemployment rates are for males aged 25-39 years old and the




ACCURACY OF MULTI-VARIABLE MODEL USING R/W AND









General Seamanship 89.9 no 18.9 30.5
Ship's Operations 78.1 91.0 9.5 8.3
Marine Engineering 64.0 78.4 3.3 15.6
Ship's Maintenance 90.4 121 4.6 47.6
Aviation Maint/Weaps 74.2 93.6 14.9 38.7
Aviation Ground
Support 83.4 107 8.7 30.0
Weapons Control 41.2 41.2 -13.6 -26.7
Ordnance Systems 75.6 80.7 0.9 -5.8
Sensor Operations 59.7 75.1 6.6 21.9
Data Systems 68.3 98.8 14.6 57.1
Construction 81.7 87.7 -1.8 -10.4
Health 79.2 94.0 12.2 30.7
Administration 84.8 98.0 5.0 14.7
Logistics 95.5 118 15.0 36.6
Media 86.8 109 15.7 27.3
Cryptology 61.8 44.9 -17.6 -44.0
Communications 77.2- 86.7 1.3 10.0
Aggregate Ratings 73.2 86.4 0.6 16.7
*
Percent deviation from actual retention is calculated as





even greater, and the resultant predicted career retention rates would
have been even higher.
The model predicted more accurately for FY 1980-4, which is the
quarter immediately following the last quarter used to develop the
model, than for FY 1981-1, which is two quarters away. The primary
source of the error in prediction in FY 1981-1 may be the large
October 1980 increase in military compensation, which was quite
different from the gradual pay increases of previous years. If the
values for military compensation in FY 1980-4 were used to derive new
coefficients, it would be expected that the FY 1981-1 predictions
would be closer to the actual rates. The model would probably begin
to match the increased compensation with the increasing retention rate.
Careerists may have been affected by the approaching pay raise earlier
than accounted for in the model. Demanding that a model predict
across the very significant change in compensation and be within + 5%
of the actual retention rate may be unrealistic.
It should be noted that while the general trend in the forecasted
quarters is for overprediction, the predicted aggregate careerist
ratings reenlistment rate for FY 1980-4 is virtually exactly correct.
The predicted FY 1981-1 aggregate rate is nearer to the actual rate
than the majority of the occupational fields. This results points out
that a technique yielding a model that forcasts within reasonable
limits for the overall navy ratings may not yield models that predict
well when individual occupational field data are used to generate
occupational field specific equations.
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The equation to predict the aggregate rate would be a better
forecaster of individual occupational fields than most of the actual
occupational field models. Of the individual field models, only four
predicted the FY 1980-4 reenlistment rate within + 5% and none were
within + 5% in FY 1981-1. The four FY 1980-4 forecasting models which
were within the error limits represent less than 25% of the FY 1981-1
career force.
These results imply that emphasis needs to be placed on models for
the individual occupational fields if occupational specific policies
are to be made. It is not difficult to develop a model that can fit
past data and predict future retention behavior for the overall Navy
ratings. Even attempting to forecast into an "outlier" quarter yielded
more accurate predictions from the aggregate rating model than from
the individual occupational fields models.
Future iterations of this model would incorporate an updating
procedure incorporating FY 1980-4 and FY 1981-1 economic and retention
data. Updating to incorporate the new information should increase
the predictive accuracy, improving the ability of the model to predict
better the effects of any FY 1982 pay increases.
Finally, these results indicate that a linear response function
may not be the best functional form for reenlistment behavior. Perhaps
a logistic response model incorporating a decreasing returns effect
to changes in relative military compensation should be examined. Future
research into forecasting reenlistment rates should explore this
possibility. No matter which functional form is utilized, attention
78

should be given to the possibility of time-lagged relationships
between the independent variables and reenlistment rates.
D. SUMMARY OF CAREER RETENTION MODELS
Under the assumption of linearity of the relationship between
the economic variables and the career retention rate, the following
models showed the best forecasting performance for the indicated
occupational fields:












To use Massell's model the mean and STD deviation of the reservation


















Mean = -STD DEV x regression constant
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The reservation wage and proposed military wage are then normalized
and the predicted reenlistment rate is found by:
reenlistment rate = 1 - Prob (Reservation Wage ? Military Wage)
A more detailed discussion can be found in Section II. A. 3 of this
study, and in Reference 5.
To use the monthly CRMC (.unemployment) models the proposed CRMC
(unemployment) is multiplied by the regression coefficient, and the
regression constant is added to that product. The result is the
predicted career retention rate.





Ship's Operations .000625 -.11000
Marine Engineering .000613 -.24400
Sensor Operations .000271 .16100
Health .000271 .35900






Data Systems .05300 .31600






Although the above equations represent the best forecast models
found in this study, care should be taken in relying on them too
heavily. As was discussed in the Relative Wage and Unemployment model,
the relationship between the economic variables and career retention
may not be linear. In addition, as of this writing, the reenlistment
rates have not "leveled off" so the precise relationship between the
change in military compensation due to the October 1980 pay raise and
career retention is difficult for any model based on data prior to




This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that career enlisted petty
officer retention behavior varies considerably over the occupational
fields and that previously successful models may not enjoy the same
success when used to predict occupational group retention. Models
which have good fits to historic data do not necessarily predict future
reenlistment behavior with acceptable accuracy.
The development of econometric models for the occupational fields
was not attempted in any discovered previous research efforts. This
study, therefore, should be considered as an initial investigation
into the efficacy of using the occupational field grouping method to
manpower policy analysis and forecasting,
The variation of results between the occupational fields indicates
that manpower policy should be sensitive to the individual characteris-
tics of the fields. No one model has an universally successful fit
or predictive value over the 17 fields and the aggregate. Unemployment,
specific to the age group being investigated, was seen to be both the
best single variable model for fit to historic data and equal to
Massell's probability model in prediction of future retention. However,
the fact that Massell's model uses CRMC, a major policy variable, leads
to the conclusion that it is the best single variable model.
Some occupational fields were not successfully fit or predicted
by any model, or at least by no more than one. The fields of
Ordnance Systems, Sensor Operations, Data Systems, Media, and
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Cryptology had the poorest fits and forecast results. Of these fields,
only Data Systems and Media have easily recognizable civilian counter-
parts. The lack of a variable to accurately reflect the related civilian
opportunities may be the source of the failure in the models which used
a military/civilian wage ratio.
It is clear from the results that it is easier to generate an R of
greater than .40 than it is to predict within + 5% of the actual rate
over two quarters. All of the models in this study were developed
using historical data from 1976 to 1980. The yearly military pay in-
creases kept at a rather consistant rate over these years. The civilian
economic indicators of unemployment and the various wage indices also
changed somewhat linearly. Inflation rose at a near linear rate as
reflected by the change in the purchasing power index used to deflate
CRMC and average weekly earnings. The resultant models, therefore,
were fit to a relatively steady change in the independent variables.
Starting with FY 1980-4, however, military compensation, and the national
economic outlook changed considerably.
The military pay raise of October, 1980 was the largest pay raise
relative to the existing pay since the raise of 1971. The starting of
Career Sea Pay and Variable Housing Allowance for all personnel, along
with the increase in base pay and BAQ, significantly increased regular
military compensation. The magnitude of the pay increase and the
criteria for receiving Career Sea Pay were well publicized in the
fourth quarter FY 1980-4. For the first time pay factors other than
base pay and BAQ could be considered a significant portion of the
average service member's military compensation. It certainly should
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not be considered a mere coincidence that the retention rates for
first termers, second termers, and careerists jumped many percentage
points during the quarter preceeding the large pay hike. After the
raise went into effect the retention rates continued to rise. Any
retention equation containing a military compensation component is
affected by this abnormally high change in retention rates. To demand
that an equation accurately reflect the change may be unrealistic.
FY 1981 has been an "outlier" year for other reasons. The land-
slide election of a conservative president and the first Republican
majority in the Senate in 28 years may have affected service members'
decisions about remaining in the military, The trend toward con-
servatism in the U.S. Government has been well publicized. Even if
history will provide that the publicity or perception was greater than
the fact, it is reasonable to assume that political, economic, and
personal decisions have been made in the past eight months with at
least some thought to the future under a government with a conservative
executive and senate.
Finally, much publicity has been given to the possibility of a
recession, both worldwide and national. Again, whether real or not,
the average citizen is confronted by mass media publicity of approaching
difficult economic conditions. A career petty officer may opt to
remain in the navy with a reasonably secure chance of remaining on
active duty until the first opportunity for retirement. The alterna-
tive is to leaving the service and becoming unemployed or under-
employed in the civilian sector.
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For all of the above listed reasons it may have been too demanding
to expect a prediction within + 5% of the actual rate as a criterion
for success of a model. If the retention rates continue to rise, or if
they level off, or if they fall to below the current levels the models
will have to be updated. Fortunately, the data bases used in this
study are updated and published each quarter and no esoteric manipula-
tion of data is necessary to update the models.
The fact that the 25-39 year old male unemployment variable was
often entered first into the linear regression equations indicated that
any future models of retention behavior should consider strongly using
a cohort specific unemployment variable. Excluding teenager and
elderly unemployment from a model developed for a very different
population is conceptually more pleasing than using the national un-
employment rate. Future studies might seek to determine whether the
average service member nearing a reenlistment point actually seeks
outside employment or at least scans the job market prior to making
the final decision. If the service member does not, then his perception
of civilian employment opportunities is affected by mass media cover-
age which almost always reports only the national unemployment rates.
Bradley's results indicate that the national unemployment rate is a
significant variable. If, however, the careerist looks more closely
into his particular job opportunities, then the unemployment rate for
persons in his/her age group will probably have the greater influence,
and this study's results concerning the specificity of the unemploy-
ment variable will be reinforced.
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This study concludes that the definitive model for retention policy
analysis and/or forecasting has not yet been developed. The success
of Massell's model when matched against multi predictor models is, with
the effect of unemployment discussed above, an area that deserves
further investigation.
The goals of this study have been met. Previously successful
reenlistment models were subjected to close scrutiny in this thesis.
Economic variables such as military compensation, civilian earnings
opportunities, and civilian unemployment were tested for their
relationship to career reenlistment behavior. Generally, these
variables were judged to be statistically significant predictors of
reenlistment behavior,,
It does appear that a selective military compensation policy,
which discriminates between occupational fields, is warranted. The
magnitude of this discrimination and any affect, adverse or positive,
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